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The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical
origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as
rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves
unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great
importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception
of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the
current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems
that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions
and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with
that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain
types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it
can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which
lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian
conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of
learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; (2) behavioral, through which the agent
achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”);
and (3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose
new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework
concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological
conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an
important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as a cognitive enrichment of behavior,
are a crucial resource for understanding human learning and behavioral plasticity.
Keywords: goal-directed actions, Aristotle, basal ganglia, cognitive control, prefrontal cortex, implicit memory,
procedural learning
INTRODUCTION
In order to achieve a deep understanding of the main topics
concerning the human mind, neuroscience must dialog with
other sources of knowledge. In addition, from time to time, it
is necessary to take a break from experimental work and ponder
whether certain things taken for granted need to be revisited. Such
is the case, in our opinion, with the concept of habit and habit
learning. This revisiting has been profitably carried out in previ-
ous approaches to other topics, such as the self (Northoff, 2012).
In general terms, on the basis of experimental research in neu-
roscience, a habit is defined as a motor or cognitive routine that,
once it is triggered, completes itself without conscious supervi-
sion. Furthermore, it has always been characterized via terms such
as “unconscious”, “rigid”, “automatic” and, more importantly,
“non-teleological”: that is, as the opposite of goal-directed. How-
ever, the original and most elegant description of habits, which
goes back to Aristotle, defines them as acquired dispositions
that improve the agent’s performance, making him/her more
successful in the quest to achieve a goal. The neuropsychological
distinction between goal-directed actions and habits (Dickinson,
1985) is, therefore, hardly compatible with this perspective. This
distinction is based on two key phenomena: some behavior is
habitual if it is performed even after (1) outcome devaluation or
(2) a degradation of the action-outcome contingency. In other
words, “habitual” behavior according to neuroscience is defined
by the absence of self-proposed goals and a lack of cognitive con-
trol. These two elements, however, are crucial in the Aristotelian
conception of habit.
This article will review, very briefly, the mainstream view of
habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration, as well as the
challenges that recent research projects are encountering due to
their reliance on this definition. We propose a multidisciplinary
revised version of the notion of habit based on Aristotle’s work,
and we explain to what extent it may help neuroscientific research.
Finally, we suggest certain novel approaches to experimental
research on habits, in order to attain a deeper understanding of
the human mind.
In this article, our main purpose is not just to expose a
terminological confusion that exists between neuroscience and
philosophy. In fact, the common view of habit in neuroscience
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derives from a more specific view, which has its own history
(Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014; Blanco, 2014). In our opinion,
the notion of habit drawn from classical philosophy allows a
better understanding of learning, including the role of routines
and automatisms, in human behavior. We also believe that a
richer view of habits in neuroscience may provide an improved
interpretation of such “dichotomies” as conscious-unconscious,
automatic-controlled, or teleological-ateleological, and may ulti-
mately help to demonstrate that, in the case of human beings,
these are not black and white processes employing binary vari-
ables, but arise from the complex interplay that configures human
action.
CURRENT VIEW OF HABITS IN NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS
THEORETICAL INSPIRATION
An extensive review of the notion of habit in neuroscience is
beyond the scope of this article, and we refer the reader to
the works and reviews cited below for further reading. How-
ever, we summarize in a few paragraphs the conceptual back-
ground where habits reside in neuroscience, mainly based on
the works by Anthony Dickinson and Ann Graybiel. The explicit
investigation of habits in neuroscience is quite recent. This is
a remarkable issue, if we accept that “we act according to our
habits, from the time we rise and go through our morning
routines until we fall asleep after evening routines” (Graybiel,
2008). All throughout the twentieth century, research on habits
has centered on animal research, specifically on how behavioral
patterns, i.e., motor routines, are developed and executed in
non-human animals (see, for a historical review, the article by
Seger and Spiering, 2011). One of the most important topics
when studying habits in the field of neuroscience has been the
relationship between actions, habits and goals. In that sense,
the work by Dickinson (1985) was the seminal contribution.
In his work, habits are overtly opposed to teleological actions,
and identified with stimulus-response pairings. The main dif-
ference between these two processes is that, whereas actions are
outcome-oriented and thus sensitive to reward devaluation or
extinction, habits are just guided by the stimulus itself, and
not by the outcome it leads to (Adams and Dickinson, 1981).
Thus, a behavior is considered a habit when the animal insists
on its performance in spite of outcome devaluation, or of the
degradation of the contingency between the action and the
outcome (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Yin and Knowlton,
2006). This is the mainstream view of habits in various sub-
disciplines within neuroscience, such as experimental psychol-
ogy (Dickinson et al., 1998), psychiatry (Gillan et al., 2011),
neuroanatomy (Yin and Knowlton, 2006) and neurocomputa-
tion (Balleine et al., 2008). Graybiel (2008) wraps this view up
stating that habits are largely learned after extensive experience,
remaining fixed and performed automatically, and they involve
a structured action sequence triggered by a stimulus. Graybiel’s
view on habits is not so clearly focused on the opposition
between goal-directed actions and habits, although the defining
characteristics of the latter, as proposed by her, are oriented
towards those characteristics as defined by Dickinson. Goals are
explicitly present during action evaluation and selection, but
they increasingly blur the more an action is repeated. The main
examples of habits Graybiel proposes are fixed action patterns, i.e.,
complex repetitive behaviors in animals, and repetitive behaviors
and thoughts in human pathological conditions, such as Tourette
syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorders, and stereotypies in
Huntington’s and Parkinson’s diseases, as well as in addictive
disorders. Therefore, a habit completely disengaged from a goal
becomes either a stimulus-response pair in animals, or a patho-
logical trait in humans. Graybiel also thinks that habits play
an important role in societal terms, when they are shaped as
mannerisms and rituals. However, the link between the anatom-
ical and physiological bases of habits and their social expression
is not clear at all, mostly because the majority of the exper-
iments are carried out in laboratory animals. At a theoretical
level, Graybiel describes an intuitive classification of habits as
“neutral”, “good” or “bad”. Good habits would be those we strive
to incorporate in our behavior, whereas bad habits are those
that powerfully take control of our behavior. This categoriza-
tion seems to leave a door open to include goals as drivers of
habits: we interpret Graybiel’s “good” habits as those rationally
directed to a goal, and “bad” habits as behavioral dispositions
to perform rigidly defined actions uncontrolled by cognitive
processes.
This is, very broadly, the current view of habits in neu-
roscience. In our opinion, it is of great interest to analyze
the theoretical foundations of this conception, and to con-
sider other alternatives that could enrich the study of habits in
human neuroscience. As Seger and Spiering (2011) state in their
recent review, the notion of habit in neuroscience is inspired
by the view of the psychologist and philosopher William James
(1890). James is also credited by Dickinson and Graybiel in
their works. A succinct but clear explanation of the influences
received by James in the formulation of his conception of habit
has been recently published (Blanco, 2014), and we outline it
here. According to James, habits can be innate or learned. In
both cases they are based on plasticity, understood as a fea-
ture of inert matter, an idea taken from the French psychol-
ogist Léon Dumont: habit is just an analogy of the natural
laws that affect the inanimate universe, but applied to living
beings. Another important influence on William James’s idea
of habit is that of William Benjamin Carpenter, an expert on
comparative neurology whose conception of the unconscious
inspired James. However, the main philosophical branch that
influenced James was associationism, as understood by Alexander
Bain and John Stuart Mill. This is the theoretical background
that has had the greatest impact on the study of habit by
neuroscience. The main idea is as follows: habits are based on
the plasticity of matter, and they subserve adaptive purposes.
Moreover, a habit can be chunked into smaller pieces that are
automatically assembled: this is the main feature of associa-
tionism, and the start point of the Pavlovian stimulus-response
pairing.
Another recent publication gives an extremely interest-
ing genealogy of the concept of habit over the course of
the history of philosophy and neuroscience (Barandiaran and
Di Paolo, 2014). These authors state that “neuroscientific
research on habit remains rooted within a narrow theoreti-
cal tradition”. Interestingly for the purpose of our manuscript,
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Barandiaran and Di Paolo (2014) acknowledge that the first
description of habits was developed by Aristotle, and further
interpretations of his findings have given rise to two opposed
branches: organicism and associationism. According to these
authors, the latter is the only theoretical influence in the study of
habits in neuroscience. It is based on the idea that mental states
are formed by the association of simpler units. Furthermore,
the probability of one unit’s occurrence automatically following
another’s increases when they have been contiguously presented
in the past. The organicist view, although it has its origin in
Aristotle, has been developed on the basis of the conception
of conatus introduced by Spinoza: conatus is the essence of any
“finite mode” (let’s say, as an example, any natural being), and
it refers to the struggle to keep being oneself. Habits, then,
are intended to preserve homeostasis of the organism, a view
that differs from the original Aristotelian view, since accord-
ing to the Greek philosopher good habits imply an increasing
improvement of the agent. Going back to the organicist view,
a habit includes the organism as a whole and its environment.
The main difference between the associationist and the organi-
cist interpretations of habits is, therefore, that the former views
habits as an assembly of small mechanisms, whereas the latter
considers them to be a resource of the organism—an embod-
ied mind in a complex environment—that works to maintain
homeostasis. Barandiaran and Di Paolo place William James in
the associationist branch of the theoretical conceptualization of
habit. The associationist heritage of James is clear in Chapter
4 (“Habit”) of “The Principles of Psychology”. Habits are based
on the plasticity of brain matter and are characterized by the
sequential functioning of different brain regions: “a simple habit,
as every other nervous event (. . .) is, mechanically, nothing but
a reflex discharge. (. . .) The most complex habits, (. . .) are, from
the same point of view, nothing but concatenated discharges in
the nerve-centers”.
At this point, we believe it may be useful to move back and
forth between William James and the current notion of habit
in neuroscience, in order to understand their similarities and
differences. One of the results of James’s research is that “habit
diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are per-
formed”. When we are learning a skill, “we interrupt ourselves at
every step by unnecessary movements and false notes. When we
are proficient, on the contrary, the results not only follow with
the very minimum of muscular action requisite to bring them
forth, they also follow from a single instantaneous ‘cue’”. This is
the conceptual origin of the physiological chunking proposed by
Graybiel and others (Graybiel, 1998; Barnes et al., 2005; Seger,
2008): when an animal is learning a motor sequence de novo,
there is a continuous activation of the projection neurons located
in the sensorimotor striatum; however, when the sequence is
well-learned, these cells are significantly activated just in certain
landmarks of the task, such as at the beginning and the end of the
sequence. The decline in conscious attention suggested by James
is also supported by current neuroscience, since the consolidated
chunked activity in the motor aspects of the striatum during the
performance of a well-learned motor sequence correlates with a
decreased activity in the cognitive part of this brain area (Smith
and Graybiel, 2014; Thorn and Graybiel, 2014).
We have outlined here the influence of William James on the
current notion of habit in neuroscience, although much more
could be said about this topic. The main conclusions of this
initial part of our research are as follows: (1) most neuroscien-
tists working on habits overtly credit the influence of James in
their research; (2) James’s proposal is based on associationism,
that is, small units that mechanically follow each other; (3) this
association is the theoretical inspiration for the physiological
chunking proposed as the neural bases of habits; and (4) having
this theoretical background, experimental neuroscience has set
the following condition for an action to be considered a habit:
its performance must remain unchanged in the face of outcome
devaluation and degradation of action-outcome contingency.
LIMITATIONS
A notion of habit based solely on William James’s thought entails
obvious benefits: neuroscientific research has achieved major
advances in the study of the neurobiological foundations of motor
routines, the relation of consciousness with habits, the mecha-
nisms of instrumental learning in animals and the implication of
these phenomena in human disorders, for example. However, this
view is also limited to some extent, and we suggest overcoming
these limitations with a different theoretical interpretation of
habits.
The main shortcoming is that the opposition between goal-
directed actions and habits—founded on the associationist
view and developed on the basis of excellent animal research
(Dickinson, 1985)—works experimentally, but it is far from
explaining the complexity of human habits. This opposition has
the strong point of being impeccable from an experimental point
of view: a goal-directed action is driven by the outcome it leads
to, whereas a habit is carried out even in the case of outcome
devaluation or degradation of the action-outcome contingency.
Therefore, experimentally and by definition, there cannot be goal-
directed habits. However, this is not what we observe in human
behavior, where many habits, even the simplest ones, such as
tying one’s shoelaces, are goal-directed. As we will explain later,
the fact of being or not being goal-directed is not necessarily
the critical issue for distinguishing non-habitual from habitual
behavior. It is interesting to note that the identification of habits
as ateleological behavior is an interpretation of James’s work,
although he himself does not put it in those terms. In fact, the first
conclusion of his analysis is that “habits simplify the movements
required to achieve a given result”. Thus, habits can be oriented
towards a goal. When giving examples of human habits, he tended
to mention musical performance, although the current notion in
neuroscience is based more intensely on his “negative” examples,
generally termed “slips-of-action”: once a behavioral sequence
is initiated it can continue even beyond the intention that has
elicited it: “Who is there that has never wound up his watch
on taking off his waistcoat in the daytime, or taken his latchkey
out on arriving at the door-step of a friend?”. Slips-of-action
have been studied in the context of obsessive-compulsive disorder,
where patients’ performance seems to be ateleological and, as
some authors see it, “habitual”. Undoubtedly, acquiring a habit
implies some determination; however, it is also worth noting that
James leaves a door open to the conscious control of habits, since
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they “immediately call our attention if they go wrong”. Although
we will not discuss the issue here for the sake of brevity, recent
neuroscience research works accept that goals and habits are not
strangers to each other: they can be intertwined in various ways,
and not just during habit acquisition (Wood and Neal, 2007;
Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013; Duncan, 2013).
Seger and Spiering uncover more limitations of this narrow
view of habits, although they do not question the theoreti-
cal background that underlies them. When referring to habits
and habit learning, the common interpretation of these phe-
nomena employs several dichotomies to clearly distinguish
them from goal-directed actions: rigid/flexible, slow/fast, uncon-
scious/conscious, automatic/controlled, insensitive/sensitive to
outcome revaluation (Seger and Spiering, 2011). At this point,
we want to stress that these authors challenge a restrictive view of
these “defining” characteristics of habits: (1) action categorization
in the basal ganglia makes it possible to deal with new stimuli as if
they were well-learned, allowing for some flexibility; (2) it is not
clear how many trials are necessary for an “action” to become a
“habit”, and for reaching a behavioral asymptote; (3) the various
aspects of the basal ganglia (associative, sensorimotor and limbic)
seem to be involved in conscious and unconscious learning, the
distinction between which is far from being sharp (Horga and
Maia, 2012); (4) automaticity has usually been assessed by dual-
task performance, which is not actually an exclusive indicator of
automaticity; and (5) outcome revaluation is a straight-forward
method to be used in laboratory animals, but not quite so in
humans.
In our opinion, the main problem with applying these cate-
gories to human behavior comes from the direct extrapolation
of animal experiments to human research. Human cognitive
resources are clearly different from those in animals. An inflexible
comparison between the results of animal and human research
would only shed light on the lowest levels of human cognition.
If we focus our research strictly on those habits that animals are
able to perform, or on those that fulfill the current theoretical
model, we will constrain research on human neuroscience to
investigating very simple habits. This interspecies correspondence
could be also a consequence of the associationist heritage of the
concept of habit, if the researcher assumes that the smaller units
that constitute habits are the same in humans and non-human
animals. Therefore the main limitation is, in our opinion, that
habits are held as being apart from cognition, and this is why
they are considered ateleological, rigid, unconscious, automatic
and insensitive to outcomes. We next intend to demonstrate that
the first conception of habit, found in classical Greek philosophy,
incorporates cognitive control as a crucial element in its acquisi-
tion and performance, and that this theoretical framework may
help in overcoming the limitations posed by the associationist
view of habits in neuroscience.
THE ORIGINAL DEFINITION OF HABIT
As we have seen, the dominant vision of habits in neuro-
science conceives of them as a routine, very similar to the
releasing mechanism that ethologists employ to analyze instinct
(Tinbergen, 1951). The main difference between the two is that
habits are not innate but acquired. After acquisition, they are
considered to behave in a similar way as instincts: inflexibly,
automatically and unconsciously.
However, this is not the first characterization of habit, histor-
ically speaking. The pioneering definition and analysis of habits
were carried out by Aristotle, whose view has the great advantage
of not being conditioned by the sharp distinction between con-
scious and unconscious processes, a dichotomy which is frequent
in modern and contemporary thought. He explains his concep-
tion of habit in his book Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 2002).
Our analysis is based on the original version in ancient Greek,
although we will cite versions translated into English for clarity.
We have also freely translated some terms to show their similarity
with concepts currently used in neuroscience, as we explain below.
According to the Aristotelian view, acquired habits presup-
pose behavioral plasticity, so that the agent can acquire new
patterns of behavior in order to achieve a desired adaptation and
so be more successful in the pursuit of his/her goals. Aristotle
characterizes habits as dispositions, that is, particular arrange-
ments of human capacities. The cornerstone that underlies the
Aristotelian theory of action is the following: when an agent
does or makes something, there is an effect not only on the
receiver of the action or the product made, but also—and more
importantly—on the agent. This is mainly explained in Book IX,
chapter 8, 1050b 23–38 of Metaphysics (Aristotle, 2007) and in
Book 3, chapter 7, 431a 5–9 of On the soul (Aristotle, 1986).
Since human actions are driven and controlled by cognition,
each new action leaves a footprint in the agent as a kind of
learning: a disposition to face further similar situations in a
certain way, which includes the interpretation of that situation
and the possible ways of dealing with it. In some types of learning,
this disposition also includes affective control and corporal skills.
Please note that although Aristotle is highly subtle in his analysis,
his conclusions are plain: one acquires a new ability by doing
or making things related to that ability. As he states in Book
2 of the Nicomachean Ethics: “for the things we have to learn
before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g., men
become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre;
so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (Aristotle, 2002). We
add: through our actions, we acquire the disposition or habit
of being builders, mathematicians, piano players or temperate.
Since these habits are gained through practice, this process is goal
directed.
In these first paragraphs we have outlined the Aristotelian
view on habits, their place in his philosophical system and their
characterization as learned dispositions. Next, we will show the
ability of this conception to account for “good” and “bad” habits.
As we mentioned above, this categorization has been suggested by
Graybiel, who considers good habits as being those which we try
to incorporate in our behavior, and bad habits as those that take
control of our behavior (Graybiel, 2008). If we consider a habit to
be a mere motor routine (or a behavior that remains unchanged
after outcome devaluation or degradation of action-outcome con-
tingency), it is hard to categorize it as good or bad in itself, because
this usually depends on the context in which it is triggered.
In our opinion, there is a key factor involved in considering
habits as good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate: cognitive
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control. Through it, the agent can direct his or her behavior more
adequately to the goal. If the acquisition of a habit implies a better
cognitive control of the actions related to that habit, it can be
considered as “good”. Otherwise, if it involves rigidity and blurs
the goal, it is a “bad” habit. Since “good” and “bad” (or the Aris-
totelian terms “virtue” and “vice”) may sound odd to the neuro-
scientific community, we will term them “habits-as-learning” and
“habits-as-routines”, thus highlighting the behavioral plasticity or
the rigidity they lead to. In Book V of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he
states that “‘habit’ means a disposition according to which that
which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself
or with reference to something else” (Aristotle, 2007). This, in
our opinion, links habits to cognitive control and goals. Please
note that the usual view of habit in neuroscience, inherited from
associationism, corresponds to that subtype of habit that we have
termed habits-as-routine. Therefore, habits-as-routines could be
considered a cognitively-impoverished type of habits-as-learning.
This is not surprising if we consider that such view has been
elaborated on the basis of animal experiments, whose cognitive
abilities are very limited in comparison with adult humans. We
will elaborate on this point in the next section of our article, in
order to demonstrate how the Aristotelian view gives an account
of habits as motor routines, addictions and slips-of-action.
The main reason why Aristotle analyzed the nature of habits
was to focus on ethics. From his point of view, ethics imply
a broad study of human behavior (please note that “ethics”
derives from “ethos”, which means conduct or behavior). How-
ever, the path he followed included a classification of acquired
dispositions that can be of great interest for neuroscience. He
distinguished three kinds of acquired habits, originally termed
dianoethical, ethical and technical (Aristotle, 2002). In order to
assist in a better understanding of the three types, we will use
an updated terminology: theoretical, behavioral and technical.
First, theoretical habits consist in the retention of learning. This is
different from memory, the plain retention of former experiences.
Theoretical habits are not acquired through mere experience
and repetition, but require comprehension. A good example is
the understanding of a mathematical discipline, like geometry,
and the capacity to understand its internal coherence. A human
being does not become a mathematician through simple repeti-
tion of operational routines; instead, he or she must understand
mathematical concepts and theorems along with the deductions
that prove them. Therefore, while comprehension is a key ele-
ment of this type of habit, this is not the case for repetition:
it depends on the quality of the action whether or not repeti-
tion improves the ability to understand the internal coherence
of the discipline. Once acquired, a theoretical habit allows the
agent to understand new concepts and propositions, and even
to improve that particular discipline. This kind of habit is some
sort of “know that”. In spite of the theoretical nature of these
habits, they have a major influence on praxis because they allow
cognitive abilities to develop. In neuroscience, this type of habit is
usually studied as explicit memory (Schacter, 1987; Gabrieli et al.,
1998), the “aha effect” (Luo et al., 2004)—the positive emotional
response after understanding a concept or solving a problem—
or the learning of a cognitive skill (Ashkenazi et al., 2013), for
example.
The two remaining types of habits, however, improve behavior
as well as the cognitive abilities that make it possible, rather
than the theoretical abilities of the agent. In any case, Aristotle
understands them as cognitive capacities as well, instead of mere
routines. The second type is the behavioral habit, which depends
on and is oriented towards phronesis: the habit of choosing and
carrying out the best option for the agent in every situation. As
Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, “just as to practice
medicine and healing consists not in applying or not applying the
knife, in using or not using medicines, but in doing so in a certain
way”. Phronesis is a Greek term usually translated as prudence,
which is the perfection of practical reason. By exercising phronesis,
the agent achieves a rational control of desires (epithymia: tem-
perance) and impulses (thymós: fortitude). In turn, desires are
another kind of behavioral habits connected to emotions. Hence,
the key point here is that emotions can be rationally governed, and
behavioral habits are the improvement of such control through
qualified practice. Phronesis, or practical wisdom, also affects
decision making by way of this adaptation of emotional responses
to rationally proposed goals. Therefore, behavioral habits can be
defined as knowing how to act; they are the basis of ethics and are
studied in neuroscience under the umbrella of decision making
(Caspers et al., 2011), moral judgments (Moll and de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007) and in the context of the interplay between cognition
and emotion (Pessoa, 2013).
The third type is technical habits, which include those learned
skills of doing or making things qua directed to an external goal.
They usually entail embodied skills, as in the case of playing
a musical instrument, painting or competitive running. Motor
routines, understood as habits by the associationist view and by
neuroscience, would be included under the umbrella of technical
habits, since in general technical habits involve the acquisition
of psychomotor skills that, of course, are improved through
practice. However, this third Aristotelian class of habits are not
just habits-as-routines, since technical habits are also rationally
controlled and, ultimately, goal-directed: knowing how to play
the piano involves mastering certain motor skills, but also—and
more importantly—putting them into practice in the right way
and at the right moment. As Averroes—a philosopher of the 12th
century and an expert on Aristotle—wrote, “habit is that whereby
we act when we will”. This third kind of disposition consists
therefore in knowing how to make or how to do. In neuroscience
today, these habits are mainly analyzed as procedural learning
(Censor et al., 2014; Pinho et al., 2014).
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DEFINITION OF HABIT TO
NEUROSCIENCE
This section intends to show why the Aristotelian theory of
habits should be of interest for neuroscience. Before proceeding,
we would like to clarify the main conclusions drawn from our
analysis of the Aristotelian conception of habit presented in the
previous chapter: (1) an acquired habit is an acquired disposition
to perform certain types of actions; (2) this disposition, usually
acquired by means of repetition of one or more actions, makes
the execution of these actions prompter, more spontaneous and
autonomous from continuous conscious supervision, all of which
generally leads to a better performance; and (3) if the habit
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increases cognitive control of the actions, it can be termed a habit-
as-learning; if on the contrary it increases their rigidity, it is a
habit-as-routine.
As we mentioned above, the associationist view based on
William James’s thought and introduced in experimental psychol-
ogy has been extremely successful for understanding habits-as-
routines in animals; however, it is quite limited when applied
to human behavior, such as satisfactorily explaining good and
bad habits, resolving the opposition between goal-directed actions
and habits, overcoming the sharp distinction between conscious
and unconscious processes or, more importantly, clarifying the
role of cognitive control in human habits.
First, we would like to focus on the most important conse-
quence of Aristotle’s research on this topic: habits contribute to
the cognitive enrichment of actions. As in the case of the notion
of habits-as-routines, all these capacities are acquired through a
variable amount of practice: we become scientists through correct
intellectual activity (Aristotle, 2002), and we improve the perfor-
mance of a sequential finger motor routine through repetition
(Nissen and Bullemer, 1987). However, habits-as-learning are
not just the acquisition of a way of acting, but rather involve
a cognitive capacity connected to the habit that can be flexibly
utilized in different situations. As in the case of habits-as-routines,
this capacity eliminates the need for fully conscious control of
the basic components of the action in order to make possible the
agent’s orientation to further and higher goals. For example, the
pianist who can easily read the notes from the score (a mostly
theoretical habit), and whose fingers appropriately respond to
this reading (a technical habit) is able to exploit the expressive
possibilities of the instrument. In summary, this feature of habits-
as-learning is very important in order that this kind of habit may
be read as a cognitive enrichment of behavior rather than as the
acquisition of a routine. In the case of behavioral and technical
habits they imply the availability of motor skills for complex
activities, as well as the modulation of tendencies and desires
to respond positively to conscious and rational goals. There-
fore, they involve the acquisition of habits-as-routines, but their
critical characteristics go beyond their motor aspects.
Second, another important difference between habits-as-
routines and habits-as-learning is their differing relation to
consciousness. For the former, habit performance is fully uncon-
scious. In the latter, habits reduce or eliminate consciousness of
basic elements of the action in order to concentrate on higher
goals, while preserving at all times the possibility of recovering
them for conscious attention. Although they seem unconscious
and routinely performed, they are at the disposition of conscious-
ness. They are not, in any case, rigid sequences. The possibility
of developing habits-as-learning lies precisely in the feasibility
of chunking those movements, actions and sequences, in order
to organize them in other ways to perform different actions.
Thus, pianists can learn how to play piano by repeating several
motor routines, but they are not restricted to playing the routines
they practice: their ability goes beyond those fixed movements
to include improvisation. Therefore, the definition of habits-as-
learning does not depend on the dichotomy of consciousness
vs. unconsciousness. This is particularly important when this
opposition is at stake in certain authors (Horga and Maia, 2012;
Cleeremans, 2014).
The third contribution is two-fold: the Aristotelian view on
habits allows us to understand the classification into good and
bad habits, as well as to explain habits-as-routines (the notion
of habit currently used in neuroscience) as a subtype of habits-
as-learning. As we have outlined above, “good habits” can be
defined as those that improve cognitive control, whereas “bad
habits” are rigid behaviors nearly impossible to be cognitively
regulated by the agent. This is intimately related to the interplay
between habits and goals: since “good” habits involve an enhanced
cognitive control, they lead us to a rationally proposed goal.
In turn, this goal is enriched by the habit, as we explained in
the case of the experienced pianist, who can concentrate on a
better interpretation of the musical piece. On the other hand, the
rigidity of “bad” habits leads us towards unwanted (non-rational)
goals or away from rationally selected aims. Thus, addictions
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005), compulsions (Gillan et al., 2011)
and the susceptibility to slips-of-action (Norman, 1981) may be
considered “bad” habits (or habits-as-routines) that could be
due to a cognitive impoverishment of learned skills among other
reasons. The acquisition of theoretical, behavioral and technical
habits requires repetition; however, a high amount of it is not
strictly necessary in the case of theoretical habits, since they can
be acquired even by a single comprehension. In any case, it is
important to emphasize that this repetition has to be qualified,
rather than plain: the budding pianists have to have self-discipline
in order to acquire habits that will help them to become virtuous.
If they get used to performing the wrong movements, their ability
will deteriorate. What is the critical feature that distinguishes a
virtuous pianist from a regular piano player? It is, in our opinion,
behavioral plasticity. If a student has acquired a set of cognitive-
driven routines such that he or she can use them when they want
to, it will result in a flexible performance. On the contrary, when
routines have been learned through non-cognitive repetition, the
final performance will be reduced to that set of routines.
This is also the case for behavioral habits: repetition of
wrong behaviors causes the acquisition of habits with a poor or
non-existent cognitive content. These are more similar to those
routines that trigger “irrational” behaviors, such as addictions,
compulsions and slips-of-actions. We would also include here
unconscious biases that lead the agent to make a decision without
considering all the relevant information (Kahneman, 2011). This
would be a sort of “intellectual slip-of-action” that leads the agent
to inadequately constrain the environment to be considered when
making a decision. Rigidity is a consequence of the acquisition
of habits that do not imply a cognitive enrichment of the action.
Moreover, it is possible that some acquired skills may fall into
rigidity and automation as a consequence of the decaying of
higher cognitive functions, which by definition are in charge of
controlling, reorganizing and reassessing acquired patterns. In
fact, inappropriate habits imply a “negative” learning style that
causes rigidity, as in the case of addiction or those technical
habits-as-routines that cause difficulties with taking advantage of
our possibilities—as in the case of the regular, but not virtuous,
pianist.
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Finally, the Aristotelian view on habits may provide new
insights on the emotional response of the agent after habit
acquisition. This is related, as we explain below, to the want-
ing/liking unbalance in drug addiction (Robinson and Berridge,
1993). Since cognitively controlled habits help the agent achieve
rationally proposed goals, they tend to increase the enjoyment of
the agent when performing such actions. However, the rigidity of
habits-as-routines and the consequent blurring of goals diminish
this enjoyment. Interestingly, this is in line with the current
experimental approach to habits-as-routines in neuroscience: if
the animal performs a goal-directed action, it has the pleasure
of obtaining the reward; however, if its behavior has become
a habit-as-routine, the “pleasure” is transferred to the response
itself or to the cue that anticipates its performance. This results in
an increased craving and a decreased pleasure after the outcome
(Volkow et al., 2010).
NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH
How can the Aristotelian notion of habit be of use in future
research in neuroscience? In this last section, we would like to
point to possible new directions for research on habits in human
neuroscience. Whereas the successful experimental approach
employing the associationist view of habits focuses on outcome
devaluation and the degradation of the action-outcome contin-
gency (Adams and Dickinson, 1981; Adams, 1982; Dickinson,
1985), we propose new criteria to be considered when researching
human habits as a whole (both habits-as-learning and habits-
as-routines). First, a habit will have been incorporated when its
related actions are performed more spontaneously, that is, with
greater promptitude. This could be quantified by a decrease in
the reaction time of the deliberation prior to the action. Second,
habit acquisition would imply a more accurate performance of
the action, especially in the case of technical habits, measured by
a decreased number of errors. Third, a categorization as habit-as-
learning or habit-as-routine could be done by assessing cognitive
control; behaviorally, this could be tested by error monitoring
and adequately switching to a different task; neuroanatomically,
by the recruitment of prefrontal regions and cognitive aspects of
the basal ganglia. Finally, considering the relationship between
the cognitive control of habits-as-learning and the enjoyment of
their performance, a further indicator of their acquisition would
be the recruitment of the reward system both before and after
performance, whereas habits-as-routines would mainly involve
the neuroanatomical “wanting” (incentive salience) system.
After these general experimental considerations, we focus on
other topics within neuroscience where the dichotomy between
habits-as-learning and habits-as-routines could be of great use.
HABITUAL DECISION MAKING
In a recent publication, we highlighted the difficulty of defin-
ing conscious (vs. unconscious) processes in “habitual decision
making” (Bernacer et al., 2014). We are aware that this concept
may sound provocative in neuroscience, since habits are related
with unconscious phenomena, and decision making is mainly
considered conscious, at least according to some accounts (Newell
and Shanks, 2014). However, the nature of a decision should be
considered with reference to its final goal. Driving is a technical
habit that entails a high number of decisions, most of which are
unconsciously made and performed: changing gear, putting the
clutch in, switching on the indicator when turning, etc. However,
driving is a conscious process overall: we decide to start the pro-
cess, we consciously set the goal, and our driving is continuously
available to conscious supervision. This framework is similar to
the hierarchical model by Dezfouli and Balleine (2013), according
to which habits are at the service of goal-directed behaviors. If we
keep maintaining the extreme dichotomy between goal-directed
actions and habits, we will be ruling most human activities out of
the reach of neuroscience.
Furthermore, neuroscience can study the interplay between
habits and decision making from another perspective. All three
types of habits considered by Aristotle (theoretical, behavioral and
technical) can be viewed as dispositions to configure one’s acting
and, therefore, decision making. In recent years there have been
a plethora of studies to determine the neural bases of human
decision making (see, for example, the editor’s introduction to
a special issue on this topic (Doya and Shadlen, 2012)). In
short, it seems to be clear that the main players are the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (Levy and Glimcher, 2012), striatum
and substantia nigra (Balleine et al., 2007). In addition, more
dorsal aspects of the prefrontal cortex supervise the whole process
(Manes et al., 2002), and other cortical regions are especially
active in highly uncertain decisions (Hsu et al., 2005; Goñi et al.,
2011). In a very simplistic—albeit accurate—way, humans decide
to perform the action that carries the highest subjective value.
This value depends on personal preferences, which in turn rely
on the history of actions, decisions, skills and dispositions that
the agent has carried out or acquired during his or her life. Thus,
in many cases, decision making depends on habits. For example,
it is well known that temporal discounting depends on personal
preferences: people may tend to be either impulsive or else patient,
and temporal discounting has been reported to correlate with the
BOLD signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007). But, how do we initially become impulsive or
patient? Is it encoded in our genes or in our neurotransmitters?
Can our actions change this feature of our personality, as well as
its in-brain correlate? In our opinion, the role of habits in decision
making is a key topic for future research in cognitive neuroscience.
RESEARCHING HABITS-AS-LEARNING IN NEUROSCIENCE
In the classical Aristotelian view, when the agent acquires a
(good) habit, he or she performs the action: (1) more easily;
(2) more efficiently; and (3) with higher enjoyment. This can be
exemplified with the healthy habit of running: at the beginning,
the jogger has to struggle to find the perfect time to go out, he or
she can only run a short distance, and finds it definitely painful.
However, as days go by, all three nuisances become increasingly
tolerable.
Habits contribute to improving action performance because
they release consciousness from having to focus on immedi-
ate goals, and allow all cognitive resources to focus instead on
higher goals. This is the key idea for understanding how habits
induce behavioral plasticity. A good pianist is able to improvise
and concentrate on the artistic eloquence of the piece, because
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his or her acquired habit allows the player to go beyond the
mere movements of his or her hands. This has been partially
studied in neuroscience under the umbrella of “dual-tasking”,
one of the measures of habits-as-routines. When a motor task
is being learned, it requires the agent to expend a high amount
of energy, since many executive brain areas are active; however,
after practicing, brain activation is more restricted and energy
consumption is thus lower (Poldrack et al., 2005). At the begin-
ning, different aspects of the prefrontal cortex as well as their
striatal targets—mainly the caudate nucleus—are in charge of the
process; however, when the task is mastered, the activation of
these areas is decreased and the putamen, globus pallidus and
supplementary motor area of the cortex have a higher BOLD
signal. This allows the prefrontal cortex and caudate nucleus
to engage in a novel task when performing the well learned
sequence.
This neuroanatomical framework is useful to understand
those aspects of habits related with the automation of behav-
ior. Automation is a condition for developing most habits-as-
learning, since it releases executive areas from a continuous
supervision of certain tasks. Thus, automations allow a cognitive
enrichment of actions. It would be interesting to research, from
the point of view of neuroscience, how this interplay between
executive and “habit related” areas is carried out not only in motor
routines, but also in more cognitive habits. For example, solving
a Sudoku puzzle for the first time may seem overwhelming. With
practice, the player discovers that as a result of performing certain
intellectual routines the puzzle is easier to tackle. Furthermore,
once these routines are acquired, it is easier for the player to
monitor for errors and deal with new challenges within the puzzle.
An area of possible future research is opened here, since error
monitoring and problem solving will find their neural correlate
in the prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex; will, however,
the intellectual routines be coded in the posterior putamen and
premotor areas of the cortex?
Another interesting subject to investigate in the future is
increased enjoyment in habit performance. Since this could be an
extremely broad topic, we will only suggest its outlines here. For
a start, it will be necessary to have an adequate characterization
of pleasure and enjoyment. Human neuroscience assumes the
reward circuit is an analog to that of non-human animals: unques-
tionably, regions such as the substantia nigra and the ventral stria-
tum are active when an animal—rat, monkey or human—receives
a primary reward (Schultz, 1997). It also happens when humans
are granted a secondary reward, such as money (Delgado, 2007).
However, human beings are also able to interpret as rewards
things that are far from being pleasurable, including physically
painful experiences. Thus, it may be appropriate to search for the
brain correlates of these phenomena.
ADDICTIONS, COMPULSIONS, STEREOTYPIES AND SLIPS-OF-ACTION:
BAD HABITS
Our article suggests a concept of habit that broadens the current
view in neuroscience; for that reason, it has to be compatible with
that very view. In this section we will briefly clarify how habits-
as-learning can decay in humans to being habits-as-routines,
leading thus to a behavioral rigidity of the agent, instead of
flexibility. As we mentioned above, a habit turns into a mere
automatic routine when its associated cognitive control declines.
The role of cognition in habits is found first in goal setting. The
initiation of a set of motor routines is meaningful if they serve a
goal; otherwise, they can evolve into a compulsion or stereotypy.
In his interesting review, Duncan (2013) cites the work of the
Italian psychiatrist Bianchi (1922), who ablated different parts
of the frontal lobe in monkeys to investigate changes in their
behavior. Duncan highlights the following section of Bianchi’s
work: “The monkey which used to jump on to the window-
ledge, to call out to his companions, after the operation jumps
on to the ledge again, but does not call out. The sight of the
window determines the reflex of the jump, but the purpose is
now lacking, for it is no longer represented in the focal point
of consciousness... Evidently there are lacking all those other
images that are necessary for the determination of a series of
movements coordinated towards one end”. Therefore, the monkey
can perform goal-directed motor habits while its frontal lobe
is intact; when its cognitive function is damaged, the motor
habits disengage from their goal and become a plain meaningless
routine.
In any case, we believe that animal research on habits should
be given due weight when transferred to humans, since the latter
are able to acquire and perform habits that the former are not.
The reason for this has been just outlined: cognitive control. The
brain area involved in this phenomenon is the prefrontal cortex,
which finds its greatest evolution in humans (Miller, 2000). Even
though most of our knowledge on human neuroscience comes
from animal studies, these are informative in the case of habits-
as-routines, rather than habits-as-learning, because of the role of
the cognitive enrichment of actions.
Finally, the lack of cognitive control in habits could be also a
crucial feature in the case of compulsions in obsessive-compulsive
disorder: washing one’s hands triggers a set of motor routines
towards the goal of personal hygiene. However, when some-
one washes them repeatedly without a purpose, it becomes a
compulsion. Slips-of-action may be understood as a temporary
disengagement between a habit and its goal. They happen when
the agent starts a goal-directed set of routines—for example,
driving to a friend’s party—and ends up reaching an unwanted
goal—arriving to the office instead of the party because the initial
part of the driving routine is the same. In fact, these action
errors have been related to obsessive-compulsive disorder (Gillan
et al., 2011). Our proposal here, very briefly, is that routines
could be incorporated in the agent—that is, coded into his/her
brain, but would remain inhibited most of the time. Only when
that routine needs to be executed do higher executive areas allow
its performance through disinhibition. Again, in situations when
cognitive control is compromised, the routine may be executed
unwantedly (Mendez et al., 1997).
In sum, we believe that future research on stereotypies and
compulsions should maintain its connection to the study of
habits, but should focus on the lack of cognitive control rather
than on the neural bases of the established motor routine, and
bearing in mind that encouraging the patient to acquire cognitive-
driven habits may help overcome rigid routines (Güell and Nuñez,
2014).
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CONCLUSION
Our interdisciplinary research seeks to provide a more adequate
framework for the study of habits in neuroscience. We have
demonstrated that this perspective is compatible with past and
current experimental research, and it expands its scope when
applied to humans. From a holistic view of human behavior,
habits are very important aspects for behavioral plasticity and
learning, since they release cognitive areas to focus on higher
goals. Further, even though repetition and routines are important
for habit acquisition, they can also be considered a crucial element
for human behavioral freedom (Bernacer and Gimenez-Amaya,
2013), inasmuch as they increase the repertoire of actions and
allow a better cognitive control of behavior.
Revisiting the ideas of classical philosophers may be very useful
for neuroscience, since the cognitive and psychological substrate
of neuroscience is composed, at least in a high proportion, of the
ideas developed by philosophers across the centuries. We believe
interdisciplinary research may help achieve a better understand-
ing of human behavior, and provide the neuroscience community
with an adequate theoretical background for undertaking new
experimental approaches and tackling the challenges resulting
from them.
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